The Case for Reform of the H-1B and L-1 Visa Programs

2026 FACT SHEET

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Highlights

• The H-1B and L-1 visa programs play an important role in our economy, but current rules allow employers to use the visas to lower standards for U.S. professionals and people employed on the visas.

• Today, employers use the H-1B and L-1 programs to underpay the people employed on the visas, bypass available U.S. workers and recent graduates, displace existing employees, and lower industry standards.

• Requiring employers to pay market wages, strengthening worker safeguards, and providing greater oversight and accountability will ensure that the H-1B and L-1 visa programs help attract skilled talent to the United States. 

DPE supports reforming the H-1B and L-1 visa programs based on the experiences of union professionals. The more than four million members of DPE’s 24 affiliated unions include U.S. citizens, permanent residents, and people working on nonimmigrant visas. Union professionals also work in industries where employers routinely use the H-1B and L-1 visa programs to lower standards for U.S. workers and people employed on the visas. Reform is needed to ensure that these visa programs live up to their true intent.

The Basics of the H-1B Visa Program

The H-1B visa is the largest nonimmigrant visa program that U.S. employers use to hire people from abroad to work in the United States for a set duration. (Nonimmigrant visas are commonly called guest worker visas, and people employed on nonimmigrant visas are often referred to as guest workers.) Approximately 600,000 people are employed by 50,000 U.S. employers through H-1B visas in a given year.[1] The H-1B visa is controlled by the employer (formally known as the petitioner), not the worker (formally known as the beneficiary).[2]

People employed on an H-1B visa and other nonimmigrant visas are not permitted to stay permanently in the United States. However, the H-1B visa is also a “dual-intent” visa, meaning one can pursue permanent status in the United States through an immigrant visa while a guest worker on an H-1B.[3]

Employers use the H-1B visa program to hire people into “speciality occupations,” which are jobs that typically require at least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent.[4] H-1B workers must either have a bachelor’s degree or higher, have a state license or certification that permits practice in the specialty occupation, or have training or experience in the specialty occupation that is equivalent to completion of a degree.[5]

H-1B visas are typically issued for an initial term of three years and can be renewed for another three years.[6] If the petitioning employer sponsors the worker for an employment-based (EB) immigrant visa, or a “green card,” then the H-1B visa can be extended in one-year increments while the worker waits for an available EB immigrant visa.[7]

Each year the U.S. government makes available 85,000 new, or “initial,” H-1B visas, with 20,000 of those visas set aside for people holding a master’s degree or higher from a U.S. institution of higher education. However, universities and their affiliated nonprofit entities, nonprofit research organizations, and government research organizations are exempt from the annual cap and can hire an unlimited number of H-1B workers. The annual cap also does not apply to any petitions for renewals, changes to the conditions of an H-1B beneficiary’s employment, or requests for new employment.[8]

Employers complete a multistep process to hire people on H-1B visas. An employer first submits a Labor Condition Application (LCA) with the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) that describes the job for which the employer wishes to hire an H-1B worker and identifies the wage level. The DOL does not conduct an extensive review of LCAs, generally only rejecting LCAs if there are obvious errors or inaccuracies. Once an LCA is approved, an employer files an I-129 petition with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), who approves or denies the employer’s petition. (If USCIS approves the I-129 petition and the worker resides outside the United States, the worker must then complete a vetting process through the U.S. Department of State.)  

In years when the number of H-1B petitions exceeds the annual cap, USCIS sets a process for allocating the visas. Traditionally, USCIS conducted a random lottery to decide which petitions are selected for approval. For many years, employers, particularly the outsourcing companies, gamed the lottery by filing more petitions than the number of positions they intend to hire for. Employers who gamed the lottery were generally not interested in hiring a specific worker, they just wanted access to as many H-1B visas as possible.

USCIS began to address the gaming of the H-1B lottery in 2024 by establishing a “beneficiary centric selection process” that ensures prospective H-1B workers have the same chance of being selected. The total number of registered petitions decreased substantially in the first H-1B lottery after this rule change.[9] Starting with the Fiscal Year 2027 visa allocation process, USCIS moved to a weighted selection process, which is intended to increase the probability that petitions promising to pay higher wages are selected ahead of petitions for employers that will offer lower wages to H-1B workers.

Even with recent changes to the visa allocation process, the H-1B program lacks the safeguards that most Americans would expect of a work visa program. In practice, H-1B employers are not required to first recruit available, qualified U.S. workers, nor are they prohibited from replacing existing employees with H-1B workers.[10] In general, H-1B employers must only attest: (1) “that they will pay H-1B workers the amount they pay other employees with similar experience and qualifications or the prevailing wage; (2) that the employment of H-1B workers will not adversely affect the working conditions of U.S. workers similarly employed; (3) that no strike or lockout exists in the occupational classification at the place of employment; and (4) that the employer has notified employees at the place of employment of the intent to employ H-1B workers.”[11] However, even enforcement of these attestations is lacking.[12]

The B-1 in Lieu of H-1B Workaround

The B-1 visa is not a work visa. It is intended for visitors to the United States, including people who travel here for business purposes on a very short-term basis, such as attending a conference. Yet employers can use what is called “B-1 in lieu of H-1B” status to bring international workers otherwise eligible for the H-1B program to work in the United States. The U.S. government does not release data on the annual number of B-1 in lieu of H-1B status approvals, durations of stay, type of work involved, or connected employers.

The B-1 in lieu of H-1B status enables employers to cut labor costs and facilitate the offshoring of work without having to comply with the H-1B program’s rules or compete for cap-subject visas.[13] For example, in 2011, the Boeing Company attempted to bring 18 Russian contractors from its Moscow engineering and design center to the United States using B-1 in lieu of H-1B status. The Russian contractors were denied entry at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport by immigration officials after admitting that they would be working, and not receiving training as they were coached to say. The Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA), the union representing engineers at Boeing, reported that at the time, Boeing had between 75 and 200 Russian engineers working at Boeing in Seattle on B-1 in lieu of H-1B status. If the Russian engineers had been on H-1B visas, then Boeing would have to pay them wages set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. Instead, the Russian engineers were paid wages that were one-third to one-fifth of what the U.S. Boeing engineers made.[14]

Quantifying the H-1B Visa Workforce

Approximately 600,000 people are employed on H-1B visas at any time.[15] They work for about 50,000 employers who have filed new, continuing, or amended H-1B petitions. The majority of approved H-1B petitions are for continuing rather than initial employment, making up on average 69 percent of approved petitions between 2019 and 2023.[16] In fiscal year 2023, most H-1B approved petitions were for beneficiaries from India or China, together making up 84 percent of all approved H-B petitions that year.[17]

The majority of H-1B workers identify as male and are highly concentrated in STEM fields, especially in computer-related occupations. Since fiscal year 2014, at least 60 percent of the H-1B visas approved each year have gone to workers in computer-related occupations.[18] In fiscal year 2023, 70.5 percent of approved H-1B petitions went to beneficiaries identifying as male, while 29.3 percent went to beneficiaries identifying as female.[19] This population usually skews younger; in 2023, a majority of beneficiaries were between 25 and 39 years old, with a third of beneficiaries between the ages of 30 and 34.[20]

The vast majority of H-1B workers hold a bachelor’s degree, and about a third of H-1B workers have a master’s, doctorate, or professional degree.[21]

Ineffectual Rules Promote Employer Misuse

The H-1B visa program must be reformed so that employers can no longer use the program to lower industry standards, engage in outsourcing and offshoring, and pay H-1B workers below market wages in often exploitative work arrangements.  

Employers Can and Do Underpay H-1B Workers

The H-1B visa program’s prevailing wage standard is set by three factors: occupation, location, and skill level. For an H-1B worker, in a given job and in a given location, the employer can pay one of four levels based in part on the job requirements, which is determined by the employer. Level 1 is considered an “entry level” position whose pay is set at the 17th percentile of wages for the occupation and area; Level 2 pay is set at the 34th percentile of wages for an occupation and area; Level 3 pays the local median wage; and Level 4 wages are at the 67th wage percentile for the occupation and area. In fiscal year 2019, 60 percent of H-1B positions were paid at the lowest two levels, meaning they were paid below the median wage for the occupation and location.

Source: Costa, Daniel and Ron Hira. “H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels.” (May 2020). Economic Policy Institute. [see footnote 23].

Outsourcing and offshoring companies have built their business models around the ability to legally pay H-1B workers less than the median wage for an occupation and geographic area. Outsourcers are regularly among the top H-1B employers, receiving an outsize share of all cap-subject H-1B visas each year. Internal corporate strategy documents confirm that these companies see the ability to underpay H-1B workers as a competitive advantage that supports their business model. In internal documents made public as part of a federal whistleblower lawsuit, HCL Technologies, a tech outsourcing company based in India, emphasized its plan to lower labor costs by intentionally paying H-1B workers less than U.S. workers. The amount of underpayment was “estimated … to likely exceed $95 million annually.”[22] However, all types of companies, including big-name tech firms, take advantage of the H-1B visa program’s low wage levels. For example, Amazon and Microsoft each paid three-fourths or more of their H-1B positions at the two lowest wage levels, and Google paid over one-half at the second lowest wage level.[23] Furthermore, the DOL does not conduct oversight or otherwise regularly ensure that companies are complying with wage levels appropriate for the job title.[24]

Employers can replace U.S. professionals with H-1B workers, enabling the outsourcing and offshoring of professional careers

Employers, particularly outsourcing and offshoring companies, also take advantage of the H-1B visa program’s lack of recruitment requirements and displacement safeguards. In 2022, nearly 40 percent of all H-1B visas were issued to just 30 employers, 17 of which were companies where the primary business model is based on outsourcing. These firms alone were issued 20,000 H-1B visas, nearly one-quarter of the total 85,000 annual limit for cap-subject visas.[25]

There are numerous examples of employers using the H-1B program to replace existing workers. In 2015, the Walt Disney Company replaced about 250 IT professionals at Disney World with H-1B workers employed by HCL America and Cognizant.[26] Similar incidents have occurred at Southern California Edison,[27] AT&T,[28] MassMutual Financial Group,[29] and many other well-known companies.

Public sector employers also use the H-1B program to lower standards and privatize jobs. In 2017, the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) eliminated nearly 100 IT jobs and replaced them with H-1B workers who worked for the Indian outsourcing company HCL Technologies.[30] Congressional representatives from California spoke out against this practice, leading UCSF to alter their hiring plan, which many viewed as a temporary move that did not fully address the issue.[31] In 2020, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federally-owned electric utility corporation, planned to outsource hundreds of IT jobs through the H-1B visa program with the assistance of foreign-owned tech outsourcing firms. Tech professionals at the TVA, who were union members of the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (IFPTE), sounded the alarm,[32] which ultimately led to interventions by the Trump Administration to prohibit the TVA from laying off its U.S.-based IT workers.[33]

In many cases, the displaced U.S. employees are required to train their H-1B replacements as a final job assignment in order to qualify for severance.[34] Requiring U.S. professionals to train their H-1B replacements facilitates “knowledge transfer,” a degrading process whereby displaced employees train their replacements on every single part of their job, often down to the exact keystrokes.[35] The replacement H-1B worker will then use the newly learned skills to either do the exact same job in the U.S. at lower wages or take the skills back to their home country as part of the employer’s offshoring of the work. The prevalence of knowledge transfer among H-1B employers, particularly outsourcing and offshoring companies, challenges the notion that employers cannot find available, qualified U.S. professionals.

Minimal Protections for H-1B Beneficiaries and Little DOL Oversight

Along with paying sub-standard wages, companies can use their control of the H-1B visa to take advantage of H-1B workers in other ways. Employers can require H-1B workers to work longer hours, skip holidays, and miss scheduled pay increases.[36] If an H-1B worker says no, they risk being terminated and losing their legal status in the United States. H-1B employers can therefore use their virtual total control over whether an H-1B worker continues to live in the United States to intimidate workers into not speaking out or filing complaints with labor agencies.

The DOL is faced with numerous obstacles in its ability to protect H-1B workers, including lack of authority to initiate investigations, inability to access the Labor Condition Application database, inadequate fines for employer noncompliance with a DOL investigation, and lack of subpoena authority to obtain employer records.[37] 

The Basics of the L-1 Visa Program

The L-1 visa is intended to be used by multinational corporations to transfer employees employed abroad to a branch, parent, affiliate, or subsidiary of that same employer in the United States. Experts estimate that there are between 310,000 and 337,000 L-1 workers in the United States at any time.[38] The L-1 visa is largely a black box. There is no publicly available data showing how much L-1 workers are paid or the duration of their stays.

For employers to be eligible to use the L-1 visa program, the petitioning company must have employed the L-1 worker within the three preceding years and have continuously employed the worker abroad for one year.[39] There are two classes, the L-1A visa is for managers and executives and the L-1B visa is for employees with “specialized knowledge.”[40] Specialized knowledge refers to “special knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization’s product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization’s processes and procedures.”[41]

For L-1 workers entering the United States to establish a new office, the initial term of the L-1 visa is one year, while L-1 visas covering all other employees have initial terms of three years. The L-1 visa is renewable for up to seven years total for supervisors[42] and five years for other qualified employees.[43]

Much like the H-1B visa, it is the employer who has control over the terms of the L-1 visa, not the worker.[44] There is no wage requirement, meaning an employer can pay an L-1 worker their home country wage rate or less. (L-1 worker wages technically must be the higher of the state or federal minimum wage, but compliance enforcement is virtually nonexistent.) Additionally, the L-1 visa program is uncapped.

Employers Take Advantage of L-1 Visa Program’s Minimal Worker Protections and Overly Broad Definition of “Specialized Knowledge”

From an employer’s perspective, L-1 visas are desirable because there are no minimum wage requirements. Employers can legally pay well below the market wage, offshore work, and displace U.S. workers. Employers only face consequences when they are caught failing to meet the lowest of labor standards. For example, in late 2013, tech company Electronics for Imaging was fined by DOL and ordered to pay back wages to nonimmigrant workers who were paid just $1.21 per hour to work 120 hours per week installing computer systems in California. The employees were likely on L-1 visas. Since there is no prevailing wage requirement, the company was only required to pay its foreign employees the state minimum wage.[45]

Employers often take advantage of an overly broad definition of “specialized knowledge” for the L-1B visa to bring employees to the United States, which in many cases facilitates offshoring. Even the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General pointed out that “specialized knowledge” is defined so broadly that “almost every petition could reasonably be approved.”[46] Much in the same way that H-1B employers have offshored jobs through knowledge transfer, L-1 employers can bring their foreign national employees to train in the United States and then export that knowledge (along with the employee) back to their home country under the cover of “specialized knowledge,” and they can do so for even less cost than using the H-1B program.[47]

Policy Recommendations

The H-1B and L-1 visa programs must be reformed so that they work for U.S. professionals and people working on the visas, not just employers. The following policy recommendations are informed by the lived experiences of union professionals.

1. Require recruitment of available, qualified U.S. workers. 

Employers should be required to demonstrate good faith recruitment of available, qualified U.S. workers and offer the job to a qualified U.S. applicant before hiring through the H-1B or L-1 visa programs.

2. Prevent the displacement of existing employees.

Prohibit contractors and direct employers from laying off, terminating, or demoting an employee in order to replace that worker with a nonimmigrant.

3. Impose equitable wage standards.

Increase the H-1B minimum wage to no less than the median wage for the relevant occupation and area and establish minimum wage standards for the L-1 program.

4. Adopt a wage-based visa allocation process.

Adopt a wage-based visa allocation process that prioritizes international graduates who earned advanced degrees from U.S. colleges and universities while physically present in the United States and offered jobs at the highest wage level.

5. Empower workers to report workplace violations.

Ensure nonimmigrants and U.S. workers are able to report workplace violations without fear of retaliation and require regular DOL audits to ensure employer compliance with visa program rules.

6. Allow H-1B and L-1 nonimmigrants to self-petition for permanent status.

Allow H-1B and L-1 nonimmigrants to self-petition for permanent status and provide them the freedom to change jobs while waiting for available immigrant visas.

[1] Costa, Daniel and Ron Hira. “Tech and outsourcing companies continue to exploit the H-1B visa program at a time of mass layoffs.” (April 11, 2023). Economic Policy Institute. Retrieved from https://www.epi.org/blog/tech-and-outsourcing-companies-continue-to-exploit-the-h-1b-visa-program-at-a-time-of-mass-layoffs-the-top-30-h-1b-employers-hired-34000-new-h-1b-workers-in-2022-and-laid-off-at-least-85000-workers/.

[2] 8 CFR §214.2(h)

[3] U.S. Department of State. Foreign Affairs Manual. 9 FAM 402.10-10(A). Retrieved from https://fam.state.gov/.

[4] The H-1B visa is also used for fashion models who work in the United States on a temporary basis.

[5] 8 CFR §214.2(h).

[6] Employers involved in DOD research and development projects can petition for H-1B visas that are valid for five years and able to be renewed for another five year period.

[7] 8 CFR §214.2(h).

[8] Ibid.

[9] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. “H-1B Electronic Registration Process.” (March 31, 2025). Retrieved from https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations/h-1b-electronic-registration-process.

[10] “H-1B Dependent Employers,” employers with 15% or more employees working H-1B visas, must follow recruitment and nondisplacement requirements unless they are paying H-1B workers at least $60,000. In practice, virtually all H-1B Dependent Employers pay H-1B workers at least $60,000 to avoid the additional requirements.

[11] Government Accountability Office. “H-1B Program: Reforms Needed to Minimize the Risks and Costs of Current Program.” (January 2011). Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-11-26.pdf

[12] See, e.g., Hira, Ron and Daniel Costa. “New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program.” (December 9, 2021). Economic Policy Institute. Retrieved from https://www.epi.org/publication/new-evidence-widespread-wage-theft-in-the-h-1b-program/.

[13] See, e.g., Hira, Ron. “Congressional Testimony: Immigration Reforms Needed to Protect Skilled American Workers.” (March 17, 2015). Economic Policy Institute. Retrieved from https://www.epi.org/publication/congressional-immigration-reforms-needed-to-protect-skilled-american-workers/; and Novinson, Michael. “Boosting U.S. IT Skills Or Replacing U.S. Workers? H-1B Visas In The Crosshairs.” (September 8, 2015). CRN. Retrieved from https://www.crn.com/news/channel-programs/300077929/boosting-u-s-it-skills-or-replacing-u-s-workers-h-1b-visas-in-the-crosshairs.

[14] Gates, Dominic. “Russian engineers, once turned back, now flowing to Boeing again.” (April 15, 2012). The Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com/business/russian-engineers-once-turned-back-now-flowing-to-boeing-again/.

[15] Costa, Daniel and Ron Hira. “Tech and outsourcing companies continue to exploit the H-1B visa program at a time of mass layoffs.” [above, n. 1].

[16] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers: Fiscal Year 2023 Annual Report to Congress.” (March 6, 2024). Appendix D, Table 1b. Retrieved from https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/OLA_Signed_H-1B_Characteristics_Congressional_Report_FY2023.pdf.

[17] Ibid., Appendix D, Table 4a.

[18] Im, Carolyne, Alexandra Cahn, and Sahana Mukherjee. “What we know about the U.S. H-1B visa program.” (March 4, 2025). Pew Research. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/03/04/what-we-know-about-the-us-h-1b-visa-program/.

[19] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers.” Appendix D, Table 5. [above, n. 16].

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., Table 6.

[22] See, e.g., Hira, Ron and Daniel Costa. “New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program.” [above, n. 12].

[23] Costa, Daniel and Ron Hira. “H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels.” (May 2020). Economic Policy Institute. Retrieved from https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/.

[24] Costa, Daniel and Ron Hira. “EPI comments on DOL Request for Information on determining prevailing wage levels for H-1B visas and permanent labor certifications for green cards.” (June 1, 2021). Economic Policy Institute.  Retrieved from https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-prevailing-wage-levels-determination-for-h-1b-visas-and-permanent-labor-certifications-for-green-cards/.

[25] Costa, Daniel and Ron Hira. “Tech and outsourcing companies continue to exploit the H-1B visa program at a time of mass layoffs.” [above, n. 1]. See also Fan, Eric, Zachary Mider, Denise Lu, and Marie Patino. “How Thousands of Middlemen are Gaming the H-1B Program.” (July 31, 2024). Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-staffing-firms-game-h1b-visa-lottery-system/.

[26] Preston, Julia. “Lawsuits Claim Disney Colluded to Replace U.S. Workers With Immigrants.” The New York Times. (January 25, 2016). Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/us/lawsuit-claims-disney-colluded-to-replace-us-workers-with-immigrants.html.; see also Preston, Julia. “Pink Slips at Disney. But First, Training Foreign Replacements.” (June 4, 2015). The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/us/last-task-after-layoff-at-disney-train-foreign-replacements.html.

[27] Thibodeau, Patrick. “Southern California Edison IT workers ‘beyond furious’ over H-1B replacements.” (February 2015). ComputerWorld. Retrieved from https://www.computerworld.com/article/2879083/southern-california-edison-it-workers-beyond-furious-over-h-1b-replacements.html.

[28] Kight, Stef W. “U.S. companies are forcing workers to train their own foreign replacements.” (December 2019). Axios. Retrieved from https://www.axios.com/trump-att-outsourcing-h1b-visa-foreign-workers-1f26cd20-664a-4b5f-a2e3-361c8d2af502.html.

[29] Thibodeau, Patrick. “IT layoffs at insurance firm are a ‘never-ending funeral.’” (May 31, 2016). ComputerWorld. Retrieved from https://www.computerworld.com/article/1670764/it-layoffs-at-insurance-firm-are-a-never-ending-funeral.html.

[30] Hiltzik, Michael. “How the University of California exploited a visa loophole to move tech jobs to India.” Los Angeles Times. (January 6, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-uc-visas-20170108-story.html. See also Hanson, Louis. “After pink slips, UCSF workers train their foreign replacements.” (November 2016). The Mercury News. Retrieved from https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/11/03/after-pink-slips-ucsf-tech-workers-train-their-foreign-replacements/.

[31] Hiltzik, Michael. “How the University of California exploited a visa loophole to move tech jobs to India.” [above, n. 30].

[32] “TVA Turns to IT Offshoring Firms, H-1B Workers to Replace TVA IT Workers.” Letter from Paul Shearon and Matthew S. Biggs to Hon. John Barrasso and Hon. Tom Carper. (April 28, 2020). Retrieved from

https://www.ifpte.org/news/tva-turns-to-it-offshoring-firms-h-1b-workers-to-replace-tva-it-workers.

[33] Kruesi, Kimberlee. “TVA rescinds decision to outsource technology jobs.” Federal News Network. (August 7, 2020). Retrieved from https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2020/08/tva-rescinds-decision-to-outsource-technology-jobs-2/.

[34] See, e.g., Hira, Ron and Daniel Costa. “New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program.” [above, n. 12]; Fan, Eric and Coulter Jones. “Insiders Tell How IT Giant Favored Indian H-1B Workers Over U.S. Employees.” (December 9, 2024). Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-cognizant-h1b-visas-discriminates-us-workers/; Hanson, Louis. “After pink slips, UCSF workers train their foreign replacements.” [above, n. 30]; Preston, Julia. “Pink Slips at Disney.” [above, n. 26]; and Kight, Stef W. “U.S. companies are forcing workers to train their own foreign replacements.” [above, n. 28].

[35] See, e.g., Armour, Stephanie. “Workers asked to train foreign replacements.” USA Today. (April 6, 2004). Retrieved from https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2004-04-06-replace_x.htm; and “Immigration Reforms Needed to Protect Skilled American Workers.” Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate. S. HRG. 114–831 (March 17, 2015). Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/114/chrg/CHRG-114shrg47421/CHRG-114shrg47421.pdf.

[36] See, e.g., Ontiveros, Maria L. “H-1B Visas, Outsourcing and Body Shops: A Continuum of Exploitation for High Tech Workers.” Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 38:1 (2017). Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/1127903/files/fulltext.pdf.

[37] Government Accountability Office. “H-1B Program.” [above, n. 11]. `

[38] Costa, Daniel. “Temporary work visa programs and the need for reform.” Economic Policy Institute. (February 3, 2021). Retrieved from https://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-work-visa-reform/.

[39] Costa, Daniel. “Abuses in the L-Visa Program: Undermining the U.S. Labor Market.” Economic Policy Institute. (August 2010). Retrieved from https://www.epi.org/publication/abuses_in_the_l-visa_program_undermining_the_us_labor_market/.

[40] 8 CFR § 214.2(l)

[41] 8 CFR 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D)

[42] Ibid.

[43] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. “L-1B Intracompany Transferee Specialized Knowledge.” (July 30, 2024). Retrieved from https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/l-1b-intracompany-transferee-specialized-knowledge.

[44] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. “L-1A Intracompany Transferee Executive or Manager.” (July 29, 2024). Retrieved from https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/l-1a-intracompany-transferee-executive-or-manager.

[45] Costa, Daniel. “Little-known temporary visas for foreign tech workers depress wages.” (November 11, 2014). The Hill. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/223607-little-known-temporary-visas-for-foreign-tech-workers-depress.

[46] Costa, Daniel. “Abuses in the L-Visa Program.” [above, n. 39].

[47] Ibid.

Use and Abuse of the J-1 Exchange Visitor Teacher Program

2025 FACT SHEET

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Highlights

• Public and private schools use the J-1 exchange visitor teacher program to employ teachers from abroad in the United States. Despite facilitating employment, the J-1 visa program lacks the appropriate safeguards to prevent workplace abuse, harming J-1 teachers and U.S. educators alike.

• The U.S. Department of State, which oversees this employment program, provides very little oversight over employer recruitment practices and J-1 teachers’ working conditions. Additionally, publicly available data about the J-1 teacher program is limited.

• Reforms are needed to ensure that there is adequate regulatory oversight over the J-1 visa program and its teacher recruitment practices. The U.S. Department of Labor should have an oversight role, J-1 teachers must be informed of their workplace rights, and more transparency is needed about schools’ use of the J-1 teacher program.   

DPE supports reforming the J-1 exchange visitor program based on the experiences of union professionals. The more than four million members of DPE’s 24 affiliated unions include U.S. citizens, permanent residents, and people working on nonimmigrant visas, including the J-1 visa. Employers routinely use the J-1 exchange visitor program, including the teacher program, to take advantage of the program’s lack of safeguards. Reform is needed to ensure that J-1 programs with an employment component are regulated as work visa programs.

The J-1 Exchange Visitor Teacher Program: History and Eligibility

The J-1 exchange visitor teacher program allows accredited public and private schools to bring teachers from abroad to work full-time in the United States. This visitor teacher program is one of several categories in the J-1 exchange visitor program, a nonimmigrant visa program that permits people from other countries to temporarily work or study in the United States. While Congress established the J-1 program to promote cultural exchange and strengthen diplomatic ties between the United States and other countries, most people enter the United States on J-1 visas to work.[1]

A school may hire someone through the J-1 teacher program if that person meets the qualifications for teaching at the pre-K or K-12 levels in their home country and if they have at minimum a degree equivalent to a U.S. bachelor’s degree in either education or the subject in which they intend to teach.[2]

J-1 visas for teachers are valid for an initial three years, and they may be renewed for up to two additional years.[3] Schools may hire returning J-1 teachers if they have resided outside of the U.S. for at least two years and continue to meet the program’s eligibility requirements.[4] 

Few Regulations Govern the J-1 Teacher Program

The U.S. Department of State (hereafter State Department), which oversees the J-1 exchange visitor program, provides very little oversight of the recruitment practices and working conditions faced by J-1 teachers.[5] While employment is a core component of the J-1 teacher visa, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has no formal oversight role. Despite facilitating employment, the J-1 visa program lacks the appropriate safeguards to prevent workplace abuse, harming J-1 teachers and U.S. educators alike.

Typically, teachers in other countries learn about the J-1 teacher program and apply to work in the U.S. through unregulated labor recruitment agencies. Unlike work visa programs governed by DOL regulations, agencies recruiting for the J-1 teacher program are allowed to charge recruitment fees and other expenses, which can amount to tens of thousands of dollars.[6] J-1 teachers typically cannot pay this total upfront, leaving them saddled with high-interest debt owed to their recruiters before they even arrive in the U.S. and start teaching.[7] According to a 2014 study by Education International, “recruiting agencies commonly earn between $5,000 and $20,000 for each teacher they place in a U.S. teaching position, with fees being collected from teachers or school districts, and in some cases, both.”[8] This profit-driven business model, coupled with unregulated recruitment practices, underscores the predatory nature of many of these agencies.

Contrary to comparable temporary work visa programs, the uncapped J-1 teacher program has no specific wage regulations other than the requirement that positions must “comply with any applicable collective bargaining agreement.”[9] Therefore, absent a union contract, employers may elect to pay J-1 teachers significantly less than they pay other teachers working in the same school. Lacking even the bare minimum protections of work visa programs, school systems that employ J-1 teachers do not need to seek any type of pre-approval or labor certification from the DOL. Employers, in most cases, are not required to pay federal FICA taxes for J-1 employees, providing a strong financial incentive for schools to skip past available, qualified U.S. educators.[10]

Quantifying the J-1 Exchange Visitor Teacher Program

Source: Compiled from “Facts and Figures: BridgeUSA J-1 Visa Basics,” U.S. Department of State (see footnote 11 for citation).  

The State Department does not release substantive data about who is employed through the J-1 teacher program, what they are paid, and in what schools the J-1 teachers work. The limited public data makes clear that K-12 school systems are increasing their use of the J-1 teacher program to recruit teachers. However, we do not know the ages, genders, or countries of origin of J-1 teachers nor the specific public or private schools that employ them. The chart below shows the number of J-1 teacher program participants in the United States from 2016 to 2023. With the exception of 2020, when there was a sharp drop in the number of J-1 teachers in the country due to travel and nonimmigrant visa restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of J-1 teachers steadily increased during this period such that by 2023, the number of J-1 teachers in the United States was 154 percent greater than in 2016.[11]

The lack of detailed program data makes it difficult to understand the degree to which specific school districts are relying on the J-1 teacher program and its impact on the overall labor market conditions for educators; however, the State Department has periodically reported on the number of J-1 teachers at the state level. Indeed, some states disproportionately rely on the J-1 teacher program. Between 2016 and 2023, six states – North Carolina, Texas, Florida, South Carolina, Arizona, and California – had over 2,000 J-1 teachers working in U.S. schools. North Carolina schools employed the most J-1 teachers, with over 4,800 working in the state between 2016 and 2023.

Workplace Rights for J-1 Teachers

Source: Compiled from “Facts and Figures: BridgeUSA J-1 Visa Basics,” U.S. Department of State

J-1 teachers working in unionized schools have the right to become members of and fully participate in their unions, and are protected by applicable labor law. J-1 teachers working in public schools are protected by state public sector labor law, while those working in private or charter schools are fully protected by the National Labor Relations Act, including having the right to participate in efforts to organize new unions at their workplaces. Additionally, J-1 visa program regulations clearly state that program sponsors and employers are not allowed to retaliate against J-1 visa program participants for consulting with advocacy, community, and legal organizations, filing complaints against sponsors and employers, testifying in proceedings, or exercising any other right afforded to them under the law.[12]

Despite these legal rights, some J-1 teachers may feel unable to participate fully in their unions because of fear of deportation.[13] In addition, while J-1 teachers are fully within their legal rights to participate in work stoppages and other concerted activities, certain visa rules could create uncertainty for these teachers about possible retaliation from sponsor organizations or their employers.[14] The lack of government oversight of recruitment and labor practices in the program is a strong factor in creating an environment rife with intimidation as few formal pathways exist for these educators to report abuses without fear of retaliation.

Teacher Shortages and the J-1 Teacher Program

Teachers and school administrators across the country have decried a shortage of educators for decades. Beginning in early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic led to an even greater crisis in school staffing shortages, as many teachers either left their jobs for other teaching opportunities, retired early, or chose to leave the profession entirely due to burnout.[15] Especially since visa restrictions were lifted in 2021, school districts seized the opportunity to employ J-1 teachers, filling some of the vacant teaching positions at their schools, at least on a temporary basis. Relying on the recruitment of people from abroad to teach in the United States – even if only for a maximum of five years at a time – is an unsustainable fix to the alleviation of the burden faced by many school administrators and their staff since the start of the pandemic.[16] As a report by the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) about international teacher recruitment notes, “[w]hile the hiring of overseas-trained teachers may be a Band-aid treating the symptom of the teacher shortage, it is in no way a cure for the conditions that caused the shortage in the first place.”[17]

A Case Study of Exploitation in New Mexico

The lack of regulatory structures leaves J-1 teachers vulnerable to abuse. We outline a particularly egregious example below, which made headlines in New Mexico in early 2021.

In January 2021, the New Mexico Attorney General sued a recruitment agency, Total Teaching Solutions International (TTSI), for charging teachers excessive recruitment fees and making misleading statements about the agency’s ability to help teachers obtain J-1 visas. According to the lawsuit, the recruitment agency threatened teachers with lawsuits and deportation if they did not pay their hefty monthly recruitment fees.[18] Furthermore, there were signs of direct collaboration between TTSI and at least one employing school district (for example, the CEO of TTSI was married to the superintendent of the school district in the town of Ruidoso). The lawsuit alleged that TTSI used its association with the superintendent of Ruidoso schools to boost its legitimacy and build connections with other New Mexico School Districts.[19]

The Attorney General’s lawsuit was filed after TTSI sued several J-1 teachers and served them at their schools for allegedly failing to keep up with their exorbitant monthly payments to the agency. These teachers, with the help of their union, AFT, successfully defeated these lawsuits and raised awareness of the exploitative conditions faced by J-1 teachers.[20]

The New Mexico lawsuit is just one example of recruitment agencies overcharging J-1 teachers. Until there is substantial change in the structure and regulations governing the J-1 teacher program, recruitment agencies will continue to charge steep recruitment fees that trap J-1 teachers in a cycle of debt.

Reforms to the J-1 Visa Program Are Needed

Significant regulatory changes are necessary to address widespread problems in the larger J-1 visa program and the exchange visitor teacher program specifically. These reforms must start with the recognition that the J-1 visa program is an employment visa, not solely a cultural exchange program. The State Department therefore needs to formalize a partnership with the DOL to implement the following recommendations. This list is not exhaustive of the necessary changes but addresses the J-1 visa program’s most pressing problems.

1.Oversight is needed

Broad and effective oversight is needed to guarantee that J-1 teachers have robust labor and employment protections, including wage regulations to ensure J-1 teachers are paid no less than their colleagues doing the same work.

2. Regulate recruitment practices

Recruitment practices must be regulated to prohibit recruiters and sponsors from charging recruitment fees to J-1 teachers and hold recruiters and employers jointly liable for abusive recruitment practices, including deceptive promises made during recruitment.

3. Empower J-1 teachers

J-1 teachers must be informed of their legal rights and have effective mechanisms for legal recourse when their rights are violated. J-1 teachers who assert labor and employment or civil rights claims or who are critical to the effective investigation and litigation of such proceedings must have their visas extended, be granted deferred action or other affirmative relief, or be provided with support to apply for U or T visas. Additionally, existing regulations that prohibit employer and sponsor retaliation against J-1 visa program participants who engage in protected activity or assert their rights under local, state, or federal laws must be strengthened and fully enforced. Finally, the regulations that permit program sponsors to suspend J-1 program participants if they “fail to pursue the activities for which he or she was admitted to the United States,” must be clarified to explicitly state that J-1 visa program participants have the right to engage in protected concerted activity under U.S. labor law.

4. Increase transparency of J-1 visa program

The State Department must increase transparency within the J-1 visa program by making information about visa sponsors and beneficiaries publicly available and easily accessible to the public. This includes sponsorship, recruiter, and employer contracts and fees, occupations, wages, employers, job sites, and demographic data.

Lastly, though the J-1 teacher program is administered by the federal government, state and local policymakers also have a role to play since public school systems employ a significant portion of J-1 teachers. The “Code for the Ethical International Recruitment and Employment of Teachers,” developed by education administrators, labor leaders, and academics, provides a template for how state education departments and school districts can engage with the J-1 teacher program responsibly and ensure they do not replicate abusive recruitment practices in their role as employers.[21]

May 2025

[1] 22 USC §2451.

[2] 22 CFR Section 62.24(d).

[3] 22 CFR Section 62.24(k).

[4] 22 CFR Section 62.24(l).

[5] While this factsheet is focused on the experiences of teachers working under the J-1 visa, extensive research has been conducted about the grueling working conditions often faced by those working under the J-1 summer work travel and au pair programs. See, e.g., “Shining a Light on Summer Work.” International Labor Recruitment Working Group. (2019). Retrieved from https://migrationthatworks.files.wordpress.com/2020/01/shining-a-light-on-summer-work.pdf and Costa, Daniel. “Au pair lawsuit reveals collusion and large-scale wage theft from migrant women through State Department’s J-1 visa program.” Economic Policy Institute. (January 15, 2019). Retrieved from

https://www.epi.org/blog/au-pair-lawsuit-reveals-collusion-and-large-scale-wage-theft-from-migrant-women-through-state-departments-j-1-visa-program/.

[6] Villagran, Lauren. “Foreign teachers are paying to work in New Mexico public schools. Here's why.” Las Cruces Sun News. (October 16, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.lcsun-news.com/story/news/education/2018/10/16/foreign-teachers-pay-j-1-visas-nm-school-districts/1618327002/.

[7] “Visa Pages: U.S. Temporary Foreign Worker Visas.” Justice in Motion. (January 2020). Retrieved from https://www.justiceinmotion.org/_files/ugd/64f95e_cd79fd93290b461c96a53817f6a02c4b.pdf.

[8] Caravatti, Marie-Louise, et al. “Getting teacher migration and mobility right.” Education International (May 2014): p. 91. Retrieved from https://www.ei-ie.org/en/item/25652:getting-teacher-migration-and-mobility-right.

[9] 22 CFR Section 62.24(f).

[10] Costa, Daniel. “Guestworker diplomacy: J visas receive minimal oversight despite significant implications for the U.S. labor market.” Economic Policy Institute. (July 14, 2011). Retrieved from https://www.epi.org/publication/j_visas_minimal_oversight_despite_significant_implications_for_the_labor_ma/.

[11] U.S. Department of State. “Facts and Figures: BridgeUSA J-1 Visa Basics.” Cached page from January 19, 2024 via Internet Archive. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20250119144837/https://j1visa.state.gov/basics/facts-and-figures/.

[12] 22 CFR Section 62.10(d) states that: “No sponsor or employee of a sponsor may threaten program termination, remove from the program, ban from the program, adversely annotate an exchange visitor's SEVIS record, or otherwise retaliate against an exchange visitor solely because he/she has filed a complaint; instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding; testified or is about to testify; consulted with an advocacy organization, community organization, legal assistance program or attorney about a grievance or other work-related legal matter; or exercised or asserted on behalf of himself/herself any right or protection.”

[13] Mabe, Rachel. “Trafficking in Teachers.” Oxford American. (August 25, 2020.) Retrieved from https://www.oxfordamerican.org/magazine/item/1963-trafficking-in-teachers.

[14] 22 CFR Section 62.40 states that a J-1 visa program sponsor is supposed to terminate an exchange visitor’s participation in the program if they “fail to pursue the activities for which he or she was admitted to the United States.”

[15] See, e.g., “Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? What America Must Do to Attract and Retain the Educators and School Staff Our Students Need.” American Federation of Teachers. (2022). Retrieved from https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/media/2022/taskforcereport0722.pdf.

[16] See, e.g., Saslow, Eli. “An American Education.” The Washington Post. (October 2, 2022). Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/10/02/teacher-shortage-bullhead-city-arizona/.

[17] “Importing Educators: Causes and Consequences of International Teacher Recruitment.” American Federation of Teachers (2009): p. 25. Retrieved from https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/media/2015/importingeducators0609.pdf.

[18] Carillo, Edmundo. “Suit: New Mexico firm cheats Philippine teachers.” Albuquerque Journal. (January 5, 2021). Retrieved from https://www.abqjournal.com/1533005/lawsuit-nm-company-taking-advantage-of-filipino-teachers.html.

[19] “Lawsuit alleges financial exploitation of immigrant teachers.” AP News. (January 6, 2021). Retrieved from https://apnews.com/general-news-6289008b86bb302fdfa55ce0fb71f4f9.

[20] “AFT fights exploitation of teachers from the Philippines.” American Federation of Teachers. January 27, 2021. Retrieved from https://www.aft.org/news/aft-fights-exploitation-teachers-philippines.

[21] “Code for the Ethical International Recruitment and Employment of Teachers.” Alliance for Ethical International Recruitment Practices. Retrieved from https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/code_intl_recruitment_2017.pdf.

The H-1B Temporary Visa Program's Impact on Diversity in STEM

2020 Fact Sheet

Download the PDF Version

The current H-1B visa program limits career opportunities for women, African Americans, and Latinos.

Women, African Americans, and Latinos are not equitably represented in science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) occupations.[1] Especially in computer-related occupations, employers’ use of the H-1B visa program to hire temporary foreign workers at below-market wages contributes significantly to this under-representation.

Federal law does not require most employers to recruit available, qualified U.S. professionals before hiring temporary foreign workers through the H-1B visa program.[2] The law also allows employers to pay H-1B workers below market wages, which is why the majority of H-1B guest workers are paid 20-40 percent less than the median wage for professionals in the same occupation and geographic area.[3] Because employers control the visa and it is difficult for H-1B workers to change jobs, the workers are susceptible to exploitation and retaliation for exercising their workplace rights.

The H-1B visa program must be reformed so that it works for U.S. professionals and people working on H-1B visas. Until then, women, African Americans and Latinos will continue to be underrepresented in the STEM occupations where H-1B usage is highest.[4]

Employer H-1B Use Hurts Diversity in STEM Occupations

Typically, 70 percent of all new H-1B visas go to employers hiring foreign temporary workers in STEM occupations. In particular, employers use the H-1B visa program to hire computer professionals. Between FY 2012 and FY 2018, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) approved 497,467 initial H-1B petitions for computer-related occupations; 78,139 initial H-1B petitions for architecture, engineering and surveying occupations; and 34,902 initial H-1B petitions for math, life science and physical science occupations.[5]

As employers have utilized the H-1B visa program to make hires in computer occupations, women, African Americans and Latinos have made slower progress towards equitable representation. In STEM fields that utilize fewer H-1B visas, women, African Americans, and Latinos are making faster gains.

Change in representation percentage, private-sector STEM occupations, 2013 – 2019
	Women	African Americans	Latinos
Computer occupations	0.79%	0.53%	1.27%
Other STEM occupations	2.40%	0.81%	2.23%

[6]

Gender Representation in the STEM Workforce

Women are underrepresented in STEM occupations, especially in computer occupations and architecture and engineering occupations, where in 2019 they made up just 25 percent and 15 percent of the workforce, respectively.[7] Women are the majority of Americans employed in private-sector, non-STEM professional occupations.[8]

Women actually made up a larger share of the computer workforce twenty years ago than they do today.[9] The increased use of the H-1B program will effectively make it impossible for women to achieve parity. The program exacerbates the gender imbalance in part because nearly 75 percent of all H-1B petitions for initial and continuing employment are for male beneficiaries.[10] Thus, women will continue to struggle for access to some of the most in-demand, lucrative STEM careers.

Share of new private-sector positions going to men and women, 2013 - 2019
Occupation	Men	Women
Computer occupations	73%	27%
Math occupations	51%	49%
Architecture and engineering occupations	74%	26%
Physical and life science occupations	42%	58%
All STEM occupations	70%	30%
Other professional occupations	23%	77%
All occupations	52%	48%

[11]

The hiring of women in computer occupations is so low that at its current pace of change it would take more than 190 years for women to achieve equitable representation in computer occupations and over 105 years to achieve the same in architecture and engineering occupations.[12]

Racial and Ethnic Representation in the STEM Workforce

The hiring of Black and Latino professionals in STEM fields, especially computer occupations, trails hiring in other professional fields and across all occupations. While there has been a moderate increase in representation for Black and Latino STEM professionals since 2013, the rate of change has been slowing. From 2013 – 2019, the share of new jobs in occupations with high H-1B usage that went to Black or Latino professionals was smaller than the share that went to Black and Latino professionals over the previous six-year period (9 and 11 percent vs. 13 and 13 percent).[13]

Share of new private-sector positions by race and ethnicity, 2013 - 2019
Occupation	White	Black	Asian / Pacific Islander	Latino
Computer occupations	51%	9%	38%	11%
Math occupations	62%	5%	25%	17%
Architecture and engineering occupations	57%	13%	25%	18%
Physical and life science occupations	40%	6%	58%	31%
All STEM occupations	52%	10%	36%	14%
Other professional occupations	61%	21%	12%	18%
All occupations	51%	23%	16%	37%

[14]

Most H-1B beneficiaries come from two countries: India (76 percent) and China (9 percent).[15] This recruiting pipeline contributes to the over-representation of Asians and Pacific Islanders in STEM occupations. As noted above, employer usage of the H-1B visa is rooted in ability to pay H-1B workers below-market wages and employer control of the visa.[16] The ready supply of cheaper labor means employers do not have to invest in training, diversity, or education initiatives.

Perhaps not surprisingly, self-reported data shows some of the largest and most profitable tech companies making little to no progress in hiring and retaining African American and Latino professionals, despite their increased participation rates in STEM professions as a whole.

Racial representation among technical employees at top tech firms, 2014 and 2018
Company	African Americans, 2014	African Americans, 2018	Latinos, 2014	Latinos, 2018
Apple	6%	6%	7%	8%
Facebook	1%	2%	3%	4%
Google	1%	2%	2%	3%
Microsoft	2%	3%	4%	5%

[17]

There is no Evidence of a STEM Labor Shortage

Employer use of the H-1B program cannot be explained by a lack of available STEM professionals. Census Bureau data shows that there are many more STEM graduates working outside of STEM fields than within them, with 50 percent of computer science graduates working in non-STEM occupations. These rates are even higher for women, African Americans and Latinos; 62 percent of female computer sciences graduates, 62 percent of Black computer science graduates and 61 percent of Hispanic computer sciences graduates were working outside of STEM in 2017.[18]

A 2016 report from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cites research from the Center for Work-Life Policy that shows how more than half of women working as scientists, engineers and computer professionals quit their jobs at some point during their careers due to a variety of factors, including hostile work environments, social isolation, the need for flexible work hours and the lack of career advancement opportunities.[19] And researchers from the Kapor Center for Social Impact highlight how unfair treatment is the most frequent reason that women, African Americans and Latinos leave their tech jobs.[20]

Conclusion

Employers are using the H-1B visa program to hire foreign temporary workers at below-market wages and with limited job mobility, bypassing U.S. STEM professionals, especially women, African Americans and Latinos.

Computer occupations already make up more than half of the STEM workforce and are projected to continue growing at a rate faster than any other professional occupational group.[21] Absent reforms to the H-1B visa program, women, African Americans and Latinos will continue to have limited STEM career opportunities. The H-1B visa program must be reformed so that it works for U.S. professionals and people working on the H-1B visa, not just employers.

Related reading:
Guest Worker Visas: The H-1B and L-1

March 2020

[1] Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Table 11. Employed persons by detailed occupation, sex, race and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, 2019.” Retrieved from https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.htm

[2] Federal law requires “H-1B dependent employers,” companies with 15 percent or more of their workforce on H-1B visas, to attest that they recruited U.S. workers and did not displace existing workers. However, these companies can forego these obligations if they pay an H-1B worker a minimum of $60,000 or hire an H-1B worker with a master’s or advanced degree. Consequently, H-1B dependent employers commonly pay H-1B workers right at the $60,000 level, which typically is still far less than the market rate for workers in an occupation and area.

[3] Hira, Ron. “Congressional Testimony: The Impact of High-Skilled Immigration on U.S. Workers.” Economic Policy Institute. March 1, 2016. Retrieved from https://www.epi.org/publication/congressional-testimony-the-impact-of-high-skilled-immigration-on-u-s-workers-4/

[4] For the purposes of this factsheet, STEM occupations include all occupations included in the computer and mathematical occupations group, the architecture and engineering occupations group, as well as select occupations in the life, physical and social sciences group, as determined by the 2018 Standard Occupational Classification system.

[5] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers.” Fiscal years 2012 - 2018 Retrieved from https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/buy-american-hire-american-putting-american-workers-first

[6] U.S. Census Bureau. Current Population Survey. Basic Monthly Microdata. January 2013 – December 2019. Retrieved from DataFerret.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Employed persons by occupation, sex, and age, 1999.” Retrieved from https://www.bls.gov/cps/aa1999/CPSAAT9.PDF

[10] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. “H-1B Petitions by Gender and Country of Birth.” October 5, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/H-1B/h-1b-petitions-by-gender-country-of-birth-fy2018.pdf

This statistic is for all H-1B petitions, including non-STEM occupations. This rate is likely higher among H-1B beneficiaries in STEM occupations.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] U.S. Census Bureau. Current Population Survey. Basic Monthly Microdata. January 2007 – December 2019. Retrieved from DataFerret.

[14] U.S. Census Bureau. Current Population Survey. Basic Monthly Microdata. January 2013 – December 2019. Retrieved from DataFerret.

[15] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers.” April 4, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/reports-studies/Characteristics_of_Specialty_Occupation_Workers_H-1B_Fiscal_Year_2018.pdf

[16] Costa, Daniel. “H-1B visa needs reform to make it fairer to migrant and American workers.” Economic Policy Institute. April 5, 2017. Retrieved from https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visa-needs-reform-to-make-it-fairer-to-migrant-and-american-workers/

[17] Harrison, Sara. “Five years of tech diversity reports – and little progress.” Wired. October 1, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/story/five-years-tech-diversity-reports-little-progress/

[18] U.S. Census Bureau. American Community Survey. Public Use Microdata Sample. 2017. Retrieved from DataFerret

[19] U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. “Diversity in High Tech.” May 2016. Retrieved from https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/reports/hightech/upload/diversity-in-high-tech-report.pdf

[20] Scott, Allison, Klein, Freada Kapor and Onavakpuri, Uriridiakoghene. “Tech Leavers Study.” Kapor Center for Social Impact. April 27, 2017. Retrieved from https://www.kaporcenter.org/tech-leavers/

[21] Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Table 1.2 Employment by detailed occupation, 2018 and projected 2028.” Retrieved from https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/emp-by-detailed-occupation.htm.